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PUBLIC UNIONS UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT 
FIRE 
TABATHA ABU EL-HAJ* 
ABSTRACT 
Unions today are under First Amendment fire, with the compelled speech 
doctrine as the weapon of choice. Conservative interests are waging a legal 
war against agreements that include “fair-share service fees,” under which 
public-sector unions are permitted to charge nonunion members to pay their 
share of the costs of collective bargaining. Espousing libertarian theories 
of free speech doctrine, an array of conservative-funded litigants maintain 
that fair-share service fees, at least in the context of public-sector unions, 
constitute a form of political speech, and that laws mandating their payment 
by nonunion members violate the First Amendment’s prohibition against 
compelled speech. The Supreme Court is poised to accept this position, 
having granted certiorari in Janus v. American Federation of State, County 
& Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case that threatens to overrule the 
Court’s longstanding acceptance of the constitutionality of fair-share 
service fees. 
Notwithstanding the superficial appeal of the compelled speech 
argument, this Article argues that pro-union interests have plenty of cover 
within the First Amendment’s freedom of association doctrine. Viewing 
Janus and its ilk through an associational lens demonstrates the fallacies 
that lie behind doubts concerning the constitutionality of such agreements. 
                                               
* Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, Thomas R. Kline School of Law. First and 
foremost, I would like to thank the students on the law review for inviting me to participate in this 
symposium in honor of Gregory Magarian and his wonderful book. In addition to Professor Magarian,  
I wish to extended thanks to the other participants at the symposium as well as Cassie Ehrenberg, 
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and John M. West. Special thanks is also due to Kaitlin O’Donnell, Sydney 
Mellilo, and John Cannan for their invaluable research assistance. 











Although it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will reaffirm the 
constitutionality of fair-share service fees this term, it is important to air 
such arguments in order to head off potentially even more significant First 
Amendment attacks on unionism that are currently underway and to 
articulate a theory of the First Amendment that remains consistent with the 
basic New Deal compromise that leaves matters regarding labor policy to 
our legislatures, where they belong. 
INTRODUCTION 
Unions, once a pillar of modern civil society, are under attack in both 
legislatures and courts. For several years now, conservative interests have 
been on a renewed mission to undermine the ability of workers (particularly 
public-sector workers) to unionize, largely in recognition of the 
effectiveness of unions in politics.1  
Legislative efforts, funded by the Koch network and facilitated by the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), have resulted in a variety 
of statutes seeking to curtail the economic and political power of unions, 
occasionally even in states where public support for unions is high.2 The 
                                               
1. See generally Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, New Conservative Strategies to Weaken 
America’s Public Sector Unions, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Oct. 2015), 
www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/new-conservative-strategies-weaken-americas-public-sector-
unions [https://perma.cc/UEY5-JQAX] (arguing that the strategic decision to target public-sector unions 
is driven by their perceived political effectiveness). 
2. Theda Skocpol & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, The Koch Network and Republican Party 
Extremism, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 681, 693–94 (2016) (noting that Americans for Prosperity was able to 
effect its goal of curtailing unions’ bargaining rights in states, like Michigan and Tennessee, where 
public support for public-sector unions was high, as well as in states where levels of public support were 
significantly lower). States have recently adopted legislation that precludes their workers from 
bargaining for agreements in which nonunion employees must pay for the union’s representation in 
collective bargaining—typically exempting firefighters and state and local police officers. See, e.g., 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.210(3)–(4) (2018) (providing that “an individual shall not be required as a 
condition of obtaining or continuing public employment to . . . [p]ay any dues, fees, assessments, or 
other charges or expenses of any kind or amount, or provide anything of value to a labor organization or 
bargaining representative” but exempting police, firefighters, and state troopers from the provision). 
States have also adopted a series of so-called “paycheck protection” reforms. Such efforts restrict the 
use of automatic payroll deductions on behalf of public-sector unions either by prohibiting the use of 
payroll deduction programs for political contributions, such as political action committees (PACs), or 
by barring public-sector employers from collecting union dues via automatic payroll deductions—once 
again, typically carving out an exception for public safety unions. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. 
Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 364 (2009) (upholding Idaho law prohibiting public-sector unions from using 
payroll deductions to collect political contributions); Mich. State AFL–CIO v. Schuette, 847 F.3d 800, 
801–03 (6th Cir. 2017) (upholding a statute that penalized unions, but not corporate employers, for using 
payroll deductions to collect voluntary PAC contributions); Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of 
Educ., 746 F.3d 1135, 1139 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); Bailey v. Callaghan, 715 F.3d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 
2013) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that singled out unions representing public school 
employees and prohibited them from collecting union dues through payroll deductions). See generally 












Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill of 2011, which significantly restricted the 
collective bargaining rights of the state’s “general employees,” was atypical 
only insofar as it prompted massive public protests against Governor Scott 
Walker for his role in backing it.3 Collectively, these efforts comprise the 
newest iteration of an impassioned debate about the value of unionism, a 
debate that has been ongoing since the adoption of the National Labor 
Relations Act in 1935.4  
Not satisfied with these legislative wins, conservative interests are now 
seeking to constitutionalize their gains. State laws allowing public-sector 
unions to bargain for contracts that permit nonunion employees to be 
charged what are known as “fair-share service fees” have come under 
particular First Amendment fire.5 While such laws do not permit collective 
bargaining agreements that mandate union membership as a condition of 
employment, they do authorize unions to bargain for contracts in which 
those employees who opt out of union membership must still contribute to 
the costs of the union’s employment-related representation, including its 
collective bargaining.6 These charges arise because states, including 
California and Illinois, require unions to represent members and 
nonmembers equally and fairly as a condition of the right to be an exclusive 
representative of the unit.7 From the union’s perspective, these agreements, 
known as “agency shops,” are justifiable on the grounds that nonunion 
employees should not be permitted to free ride on the union’s statutorily 
mandated, employment-related bargaining, which benefits both union and 
nonunion employees alike. 
                                               
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/business/economy/labor-court-
conservatives.html. 
3. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 642–44 (7th Cir. 2013) (upholding the 
Wisconsin law in a challenge brought by seven of the largest unions in Wisconsin). 
4. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 546–53 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting vociferous political debate about unionism, including closed shops 
and union security agreements, is accommodated by the fact that “[w]hat one State can refuse to do, 
another can undo”). See generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW 
DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 56–78 (2014). 
5. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 851 F.3d 746 (7th 
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2017) (No. 16-1466); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers 
Ass’n, No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) , aff’d per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 1083 
(2016) (mem.) (affirmed by default pursuant to a four-four split). 
6. These  challenges do not implicate the National Labor Relations Act, which expressly 
excludes public employees from its scope. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (expressly excluding state and 
political subdivisions from its definition of “employer”). The National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation identifies twenty-seven states as so-called right-to-work states. See Right to Work States, 
NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2018). These states differ significantly in their protections for dissenting employees. 
7. See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 3502.5 (2018); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(d) (2018). 











While the constitutionality of fair-share service fees has long been 
settled,8 conservative litigants, emboldened by a series of Roberts Court 
opinions espousing libertarian theories of free speech doctrine,9 contend that 
requiring nonunion employees in the public sector to pay their portion of 
the cost of a union’s employment-related representation constitutes 
compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.10 This term, the 
conservatives are poised to succeed. In granting certiorari in Janus v. 
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
a case initially brought by the Governor of Illinois, but now being litigated 
by three state employees, the Supreme Court has taken up the invitation to 
strike down agency-shop arrangements.11  
Notwithstanding the superficial appeal of the compelled speech 
argument, this Article argues that existing freedom of association doctrine 
provides plenty of cover for the unions. Neither First Amendment doctrine 
nor principle dictates a finding that agency-shop arrangements are 
unconstitutional for public-sector workers—and this is not simply because 
the Supreme Court upheld these arrangements forty years ago in Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education.12  
Indeed, viewing Janus and its ilk through an associational lens brings 
into sharp relief the fallacies that lie behind doubts concerning the 
constitutionality of fair-share service fees. The associational angle remains 
important regardless of the outcome in Janus, because a favorable ruling for 
the petitioner in Janus is just the beginning.13 A second thread of anti-union 
litigation, in the lower courts, has set its sights on reversing the 
constitutionality of state-sanctioned exclusive bargaining units.14  
                                               
8. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
9. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2627–34 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 
1000, 567 U.S. 298, 322 (2012). 
10. See, e.g., Hill v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017); D’Agostino v. 
Baker, 812 F.3d 240, 243 (1st Cir. 2016) (Souter, J.); see also Master Builders of Iowa, Inc. v. Polk Cty., 
653 N.W.2d 382, 398–99 (Iowa 2002). 
11. 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S.Ct. 54 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2017) (No. 16-1466). 
12. Abood, 431 U.S. at 231, 234–36. 
13. The Roberts Court’s First Amendment decisions in relationship to public-sector unions have 
created a rich academic literature. Few scholars, however, focus on freedom of association doctrine, and 
those who have generally emphasize the associational rights of the unions themselves as expressive 
associations. See Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of 
Compelled Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 471–72 (2014); Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 
1027 (2013). Brishen Rogers has gone the furthest in considering the implications of freedom of 
association doctrine for fair-share service fees, but he too fails to distinguish between the expressive and 
non-expressive components of the doctrine. See Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1630 (2016).  Meanwhile, other pro-union scholars have sought to 
develop union financing structures that might alleviate the burden that agency-shop arrangements 
allegedly place on First Amendment rights. See Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the First 
Amendment, and the Costs of Collective Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 150 (2016). 












It therefore remains critical to elucidate the ways in which both existing 
freedom of association doctrine and fundamental First Amendment 
principles support the constitutionality of state-sanctioned exclusive 
bargaining units. Doing so, moreover, offers a much-needed opportunity to 
push back on both the libertarian15 and managerial tendencies of the Roberts 
Court16 while drawing out two friendly amendments to Professor 
Magarian’s provocative account of dynamic diversity.17 The first is a nudge 
to recognize the mechanics of politics. The second, and possibly more 
fundamental, is a caution to remember that the First Amendment is not an 
end in itself. 
Certainly, as Professor Magarian eloquently explains “self-government 
requires [a] constant debate”—one which is boisterous and inclusive of a 
broad array of citizens.18 A functioning democracy, however, requires more 
than boisterous discourse. It also requires a plurality of representative and 
participatory organizations capable of translating that discourse into the 
rough-and-tumble of politics in which the ultimate goal is political 
responsiveness from our policymaking bodies.  
The freedom of speech and the freedom of association, moreover, are 
protected to ensure such politics—to ensure, that is, “that the political 
process by which those legislative judgments are made is an open one.”19 In 
other words, they do not function to take certain issues or modes of 
regulation off the legislative agenda (e.g., speech regulation)—unlike the 
Reconstruciton Amendments. Instead, they seek to ensure the conditions 
necessary such that the full range of policy possibilities are capable of 
making it onto the legislative agenda, where there is sufficient support.  
Ultimately, these two friendly amendments, like the arguments made 
below, are driven by the central commitment of our liberal democracy—
namely, that fundamental and fraught political debates (including those 
about the merits of unionism) should be left to the political process in 
Congress and in the states—where they belong. Unions may or may not be 
a good thing. Conservatives view public-sector unions as self-serving and 
rent-seeking. Progressives see them as the last bastion of middle-class 
                                               
15. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1231–32 (2014); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and 
Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1624 (2015); Amanda Shanor, 
The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016). 
16. GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMENDMENT 
DOCTRINE 228–35 (2017). 
17. Id. at 239–53. 
18. Id. at xi. 
19. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 917, 921 (2017) (“Abu El-Haj, ‘Live Free or Die’”). 











power. The First Amendment’s function, however, is not to end political 
debate.  
To the degree that a ruling in favor of the petitioner in Janus seeks to put 
an end to political debate about labor policies by constitutionalizing the 
viewpoint of right-to-work advocates, it is clearly in error. None of the state 
practices supporting unionism that have been challenged on First 
Amendment grounds threaten the ability of right-to-work advocates to get a 
fair shake in the political process. Indeed, recent right-to-work legislative 
successes are prima facie evidence vindicating not only our democratic 
process but also the value of federalism as a mechanism for accommodating 
diverse preferences.20 The First Amendment requires that pro-union forces 
be afforded the same political opportunities. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT COVER AND THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
A. The Constitutionality of Fair-Share Service Fees 
Existing First Amendment doctrine does not require a finding that 
agency-shop arrangements in the public-sector are unconstitutional. Indeed, 
existing freedom of association doctrine effectively precludes a win for 
these plaintiffs, revealing the fallacies of the alleged compelled speech 
argument that has been offered. The First Amendment objections to fair-
share service fees are predicated on a bait-and-switch (speech for 
association)—one that is facilitated by a jurisprudence that is insufficiently 
attentive to the differences between these two cognate First Amendment 
rights.21  
Contemporary challenges to fair-share services fees, like the challenge 
at issue in Abood—the precedent that conservatives seek to overturn—are, 
at bottom, claims of alleged compelled association.  Despite efforts to 
distract the Court with a variety of references to the compelled speech 
doctrine, nonunion members’ primary objection to the agency shops has 
always been that it constitutes an “impingement upon [their] associational 
freedom” to refuse to associate with the union.22 In Janus, for instances, the 
                                               
20. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). 
21. See generally Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and 
Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2014) (“Abu El-Haj, Friends, 
Associates, and Associations”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011). 
22. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225 (1977); see also Appellants’ Brief and 
Short Appendix at 8–11, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 851 F.3d 746 
(7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2017) (No. 16-1466) (collapsing arguments 












petitioner criticizes Abood for failing to notice that “[f]orced association 
must serve a compelling state interest.”23  
Once the associational claim is placed front and center, the mirage that 
agency-shop arrangements constitute compelled speech vanishes—even 
under existing First Amendment doctrine. Abood prohibits agreements that 
compel nonmembers to cover political and ideological projects but permits 
unions to charge nonmember employees fees for services related to 
collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment and similar 
employment-related advocacy.24 The former infringe on an individual’s 
freedom of speech; the latter, by contrast, are not constitutionally suspect.25  
Abood creates a distinction, for First Amendment purposes, between 
unions as associations of employees (engaged in employment-related 
advocacy) and unions as civic associations (engaged in political 
advocacy).26 This distinction parallels the central distinction within existing 
freedom of association doctrine between expressive and nonexpressive 
associations—a doctrinal fact Abood’s critics seek to elide.27  
Not all forms of association are constitutionally protected under 
established freedom of association doctrine. Instead, meaningful 
constitutional protection only attaches to expressive associations.28 
Economic associations acting in economic capacities have not been 
recognized as expressive associations.29 The well-established lack of First 
Amendment protection for economic association was recently reaffirmed in 
a challenge brought against Seattle’s minimum wage laws. The petitioner—
an organization of various franchisors—argued that the ordinance violated 
its First Amendment rights insofar as “two of the three definitional criteria 
                                               
23. See Appellants’ Brief and Short Appendix at 6, Janus, 851 F.3d 746 (No. 16-3638). 
24. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36; accord Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 5, 13–14 (1990) 
(upholding state professional bar association’s right to to “fund activities germane to [its statutory] goals 
out of the mandatory dues of all members,” but clarifying that the use of such mandatory dues to fund 
unrelated “activities of an ideological nature” is constitutionally prohibited when the member objects). 
25. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36. 
26. Dualities in the nature of unions are recognized in other areas of labor law. For example, the 
law often distinguishes between situations in which the union operates as a state actors and those in 
which it acts as a private association. Cf. Bain v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 2:15-cv-02465-SVW-AJW, 
2016 WL 6804921, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (rejecting First Amendment challenge brought by union 
member arguing that the unique benefits of union membership—in particular, voting rights to approve 
collective bargaining agreements and access to disability and life insurance—effectively coerce 
individuals to join the union on the grounds that a union acts as a private actor when it establishes terms 
of membership).   
27. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that 
“there is only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association”). 
28. Id. at 618 (defining expressive associations as those in which individuals “associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition 
for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion”). Intimate association is also protected, but 
largely under principles associated with substantive due process. Id. at 618–620. 
29. See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337, 357 (Wis. 2014). 











for franchises are based on speech and association—operating under a 
marketing plan prescribed by a franchisor and associating with a trademark 
or other commercial symbol.”30 The Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed the 
argument as “unpersuasive,” stating: “[R]estrictions on protected 
expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more 
generally, on nonexpressive conduct. . . . [T]he First Amendment does not 
prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing 
incidental burdens on speech.”31 
Thus, even if we concede for purposes of argument that an agency shop 
constitutes compelled association, the union, in its collective bargaining 
capacity, is not the sort of association that lies within constitutional purview. 
Corporations, for instance, have robust speech rights, but they are not 
afforded protection under current freedom of association doctrine.32 Were it 
otherwise, corporations and unions would be constitutionally entitled to 
restrict employment and membership on the basis of race and gender, in 
defiance of federal civil rights laws and their equivalents at the state and 
local level that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination—just like the Boy 
Scouts of America and the organizers of the St. Patrick’s Day parade in 
Boston.33  
Where there is no constitutional protection for economic association, 
there can be no constitutional protection for forced economic association.34  
In other words, even if the agency-shop arrangement constitutes forced 
association, there is no constitutional protection from compelled association 
with the union in its collective bargaining capacity. This fundamental point 
was not lost on the Wisconsin Supreme Court when several unions 
                                               
30. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015). 
31. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011)). 
32. See Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 999–1001 (explaining that First Amendment doctrine only 
protects a corporation’s political speech and the reasons for such limits). 
33. Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that forced inclusion of 
homosexual member pursuant to state antidiscrimination law violated the expressive rights of the 
organization); Hurely v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1995) 
(upholding the right of parade organizers to exclude individuals to the degree their inclusion would 
distort the group’s conception of itself); U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting 
that “there is only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association”); Cf. 
Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 1002 (drawing the contrast between protected associations, such as the Boy 
Scouts, and “commercial entities [which] have no right to discriminate, either as employers or in their 
choice of customers and contractual partners” and arguing that government regulation of the latter is 
appropriate since such entities “are not directed toward goals relevant to the democratic process”). 
34. Cf. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 468, 477 (1997) (rebuffing 
compelled speech claim of agricultural producers, in a case in which statutorily imposed fees were used 
to fund generic commercial advertisements, on the ground that “being compelled to fund . . . advertising” 
did not raise a cognizable First Amenment claim but was instead “simply a question of economic policy 












challenged the previously mentioned budget repair law signed into law by 
Governor Walker.35  
Union plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that the Wisconsin law 
significantly burdened their constitutionally protected right to associate.36 
The Wisconsin law effected four changes to the terms of public-sector 
employment. First, it prohibited “general employees,” defined to exclude 
police and firefighters, from collective bargaining on issues other than base 
wages.37 Second, it barred municipal employers from collecting union dues 
through paycheck deductions.38 Third, it prohibited government employers 
from agreeing to contracts that included fair-share service fees. And fourth, 
it required covered unions to undertake expensive “annual recertification 
elections,” whose costs would be assessed against the union.39 Each, they 
argued, burdened the unions’ associational rights. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, rebuffed these freedom of 
association claims on the ground that only association in the furtherance of 
expressive goals is protected under current doctrine. Focusing primarily on 
the limits placed on the topics subject to collective bargaining, the 
Wisconsin Court noted that constitutional protection only attaches “to 
associat[ion] for the purpose of engaging in [constitutionally protected] 
activities.”40 The court, then, observed: 
The right to associate is not derived from some ethereal notion that 
individuals be granted the right to organize for organization’s sake. 
Associational rights are rooted in the First Amendment’s protection 
of freedoms of speech and assembly. Stated differently, the right to 
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment drives the 
corresponding right to associate with others in order to engage in 
those activities.41  
                                               
35. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 2014). 
36. Id. at 351. 
37. Id. at 354 (noting that the Wisconsin law at issue limited collective bargaining “to the single 
topic of . . . base wages” while setting statutory limits, which could only be overridden by a voter 
referendum, on increasing base wages). The fact that the unions exempted were more likely to endorse 
Republican candidates did not go unnoticed. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 643 
(7th Cir. 2013) (observing that all five public-employee unions that endorsed “Governor Walker [when 
he] ran for election in 2010” were exempted from the state’s new restrictions on fair-share service fee 
requirements, but ultimately concluding that, while notable, the observation had no legal significance 
since some “employee organizations that opposed or failed to endorse the governor” also benefit from 
the exemption for “public safety employees”). 
38. Madison Teachers, Inc., 851 N.W.2d at 347. 
39. Id. at 347, 351–52. 
40. Id. at 352 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)). 
41. Id. at 357. 











The unions’ freedom of association was not burdened, it held, because the 
challenged provisions burden only their right to organize in the workplace, 
not their right to organize in the political sphere.42  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis is sound—and extremely 
relevant in thinking about the appropriate way to analyze the compelled 
association claims in Janus.43 The limits Wisconsin placed on the scope of 
bargaining (restricting the permissible scope of working conditions subject 
to negotiation and prohibiting negotiations for the use of paycheck 
deductions or the collection of fair-share service fees) do not burden union 
members’ ability to associate for political purposes. As the Court noted 
“[t]he plaintiffs remain free to advance any position, on any topic, either 
individually or in concert, through any channels that are open to the 
public.”44 In fact, there were nationally televised protests of Governor 
                                               
42. Id. 
43. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s one error was its failure to explore the arguably important 
distinction between the curtailment of bargaining rights and the adoption of an onerous recertification 
requirement. Under the 2011 law, covered unions are required to undertake (and fund) an annual 
recertification election in which they must obtain the approval of an absolute majority of eligible voters 
to maintain their status as the exclusive bargaining representative. Id. at 360. The Court upheld this 
provision on the grounds that “there are no associational rights at stake” because “[t]he certification 
requirements apply solely to collective bargaining, which is wholly distinct from an individual’s 
constitutional right to associate.” Id. at 361 (maintaining that “it is impossible for these increased 
‘organizational penalties’ to violate the plaintiffs’ associational rights, when there are no associational 
rights at stake”). To be sure, formally this provision, like the others, pertains only to the employment 
context. The annual recertification does not directly burden individuals from continuing to participate in 
the union’s expressive (and hence protected) activities. It does, however, indirectly burden the union’s 
expressive organizational capacity—possibly even severely. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The critical fact here is that union dues fund advocacy in relation to both 
constitutionally protected expressive and employment-related collective bargaining. By significantly 
raising the cost of collective bargaining, the new law effects a tax on the money available to spend on 
the union’s protected advocacy. Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7, 10, 37 (2011) 
(upholding the constitutionality of Congress’s prohibition on providing “material support or resources” 
to certified terrorist organizations, as applied to the Humanitarian Law Project (an organization which 
sought to provide legal training and monetary support for the humanitarian and political activities of two 
designated terrorist organizations) on the grounds that “[m]oney is fungible” and, therefore, any money 
given to a “terrorist organization” to enable and support its ability to engage in peace negotiations 
necessarily frees up funds to be spent on its violent activities). The annual recertification requirement is 
radically different, for example, from paycheck deductions: The latter ease the burden of collecting 
union dues, but their absence does not affirmatively tax the union’s civic coffers. In this regard, they are 
properly viewed as a state subsidy that cannot be constitutionally required. Now, some might object that 
the same problem of fungibility arises for a dissenting employee: The fee he pays take away from the 
money he has available for political advocacy. Fair-share service fees (like the requirement that unions 
independently collect dues rather than permitting paycheck deductions), however, are a cost imposed on 
doing business. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470 (1997) (noting that 
“[t]he First Amendment has never been construed to require heightened scrutiny of any financial burden 
that has the incidental effect of constraining the size of a firm’s advertising budget”). The annual 
recertification process, by contrast, is a cost imposed on the union qua civic association insofar as it uses 
its membership fees to promote unionism through membership organizing and and political advocacy. 












Walker’s policies, successful Internet appeals to feed the protestors sitting 
in at the state house, as well as a subsequent recall effort.45 
To the degree that only association in the furtherance of expressive goals 
is protected under current doctrine, the “freedom not to associate” must also 
be limited to a freedom not to associate with an expressive association 
covered by the First Amendment.46 The two postulates are necessary 
corollaries.  This doctrinal symmetry is required to vindicate the First 
Amendment’s commitment to the principle of neutrality.47 If the freedom of 
association does not protect unions from limits placed on the scope of 
collective bargaining, the freedom not to associate cannot protect nonunion 
members from being forced to participate in such employment-related 
negotiations. The two are corollaries of one another insofar as, in both cases, 
the association relates to workplace-related advocacy. 
Finally, Abood’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of fair-share 
service fees is doctrinally sound to the degree it vindicates the speech and 
association interests of all relevant parties. Under Abood, the freedom of 
speech and association of all employees, regardless of their views on 
unionism, are fully preserved. Employees who oppose unionism (like their 
counterparts who oppose legislation seeking to curtail public-sector 
unionism) are free to engage in all manner of political advocacy and 
association around such arrangements. Their right to associate, or refuse to 
associate, with constitutionally protected, expressive associations is fully 
preserved. Mark Janus is free to refuse to join the union qua civic 
association and, even more specifically, free to refuse to subsidize its 
political speech.48 Janus is also free to join civic and political associations 
that oppose unionism. In fact, his participation in the current litigation is 
prima facie evidence of the preservation, under Abood, of the right of 
expressive association. As Abood explained—   
A public employee who believes that a union representing him is 
                                               
45. See Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Angry Demonstrations in Wisconsin as Cuts Loom, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/us/17wisconsin.html [perma.cc/VY 
X4-LSCC]; Steven Greenhouse, Delivering Moral Support in a Steady Stream of Pizzas, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/us/26madison.html [perma.cc/SP3X-YZQG]. 
46. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of association . . . plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate.”). 
47. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408–09 (1986) 
(identifying a commitment to government neutrality as a central tenet of the First Amendment tradition); 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 512–13 (1996) (offering theoretical justifications for the First 
Amendment’s commitment to government neutrality between viewpoints). 
48. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 515–19 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that nonunion employees may only be required to subsidize union spending that is “germane to collective 
bargaining”—on grounds that these are “justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor peace 
and avoiding ‘free riders’”—and further that ideological activities, such as lobbying or informational 
picketing, are not germane). 











urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not 
barred from expressing his viewpoint. Besides voting in accordance 
with his convictions, every public employee is largely free to express 
his views, in public or private orally or in writing. . . . [Moreover,] 
public employees are free to participate in the full range of political 
activities open to other citizens.49 
B. Resisting Determinism in First Amendment Jurisprudence 
Skeptics, of course, will argue that there is no tenable distinction between 
economic and political advocacy in the context of public-sector unions.50 
Isn’t any advocacy by a public-sector union inherently political insofar as it 
inevitably implicates state budgets?51 Under this reasoning, requiring 
nonunion employees in the public sector to a pay fair-share service fee is 
inherently a form of compelled subsidization of ideological speech. Justice 
Alito embraced this argument in Harris v. Quinn, writing: 
In the private sector, the line [between collective bargaining and 
political advocacy] is easier to see. Collective bargaining concerns 
the union’s dealings with the employer; political advocacy and 
lobbying are directed at the government. But in the public sector, both 
collective bargaining and political advocacy and lobbying are 
directed at the government.52 
This argument, however, proves too much. As Justice Kagan quipped in 
response, the “Court has never come close to holding that any matter of 
public employment affecting public spending (which is to say most such 
matters) becomes for that reason alone an issue of public concern.”53 
                                               
49. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 230 (1977). In light of the fact that there was 
no indication in the record that the contract in question sought to limit nonunion employees public speech 
in any manner, the most reasonable interpretation of the qualification “largely,” in the above quote, is 
that it is meant to refer to the fact that the speech of government employees can be constitutionally 
limited. 
50. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 (2014) (noting the “conceptual difficulty of 
distinguishing in public-sector cases between union expenditures that are made for collective-bargaining 
purposes and those that are made to achieve political ends”). 
51. Id. at 2642. 
52. Id. at 2632–33; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 10–11, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. 
& Mun. Emps., Council 31, No. 16-1466 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner Janus]; 
Brief for the Petitioners at 10–12, 25, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 
14-915) (mem.), aff’g per curiam No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) 
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioners Friedrichs] (arguing that “the fiscal impact alone” of collective 
bargaining “makes it public-concern speech” because “there is no principled distinction between 
lobbying advocacy and collective-bargaining advocacy” insofar as the question of “how much money 
local government should devote to public employees” and related public policies, such as class-size, are 
inherently political “[i]n this era of broken municipal budgets and a national crisis in public education”). 












To decide that all employment-related advocacy is political advocacy 
where the government is the employer is to elide the pervasive distinction 
in constitutional law between the government as sovereign and the 
government as proprietor.54 That distinction is central to the government-
employee speech doctrine.55 Government employees generally lack First 
Amendment protection with respect to “speech made pursuant to the 
employee’s official duties.”56 By contrast, when they speak “as a citizen 
upon matters of public concern,” they are fully protected by the First 
Amendment.57 As Justice Kagan pointedly noted in her Harris dissent, 
Abood drew a line that “coheres with the law relating to public employees’ 
speech generally.”58 It effectively determined that “speech within the 
employment relationship about pay and working conditions pertains mostly 
to private concerns and implicates the government’s interests as employer” 
while “speech in political campaigns relates to matters of public concern 
and has no bearing on the government’s interest in structuring its 
workforce.”59  
The distinction between government as sovereign and government as 
proprietor also runs through the public forum doctrine, under which First 
Amendment rights are graduated in relation to the strength of the 
government’s ownership interest.60 Early public forum cases acknowledged 
                                               
54. The distinction also plays a central role in the so-called dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 
See, e.g.,  South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984) (holding that “[o]ur 
cases make clear that if a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the 
dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities”); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 
436 (1980) (arguing that “[t]he basic distinction . . . between States as market participants and States as 
market regulators makes good sense and sound law” and justifies the market-participant exception to 
constitutional prohibition on discrimination against out-of-state interests); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap 
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (reasoning that “[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce 
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and 
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others”).  
55. Cf. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2653 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“This Court has long acknowledged 
that the government has wider constitutional latitude when it is acting as employer than as sovereign.”); 
see also Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has long sanctioned 
government burdens on public employees’ exercise of constitutional rights ‘that would be plainly 
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.’”). 
56. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413, 424 (2006) (holding that “the First Amendment does 
not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official 
responsibilities” even when that expression arguably implicates the public interest); Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that insofar as the employee’s questionnaire was “most accurately 
characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy” that “touched upon matters 
of public concern in only a most limited sense . . . [her] discharge . . . did not offend the First 
Amendment”). 
57. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147; see also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014); Pickering v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
58. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2654 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. 
60. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); see also Robert 
C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA 
L. REV. 1713, 1749–52 (1987).  











that a government could curtail otherwise constitutionally protected speech 
in forums over which the government has proprietary power.61 Under the 
modern doctrine, whether a property is owned by a government as sovereign 
or as proprietor determines whether the property is considered public or 
private for First Amendment purposes.62 Thus, citizens enjoy broad First 
Amendment protection when speaking in “public” forums like streets and 
parks, owned by the government as sovereign, but little to no protection 
when speaking in “nonpublic” forums like federal military bases, owned by 
the government as proprietor.63 
To accept the broad argument that all speech directed to the 
government—even as an employer—is political is to constitutionalize all 
government workplaces, an outcome the Roberts Court itself has resisted as 
“inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of 
powers.”64 As the Court explained in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, the 
“unrestrained application” of First Amendment rights “in the context of 
government employment would subject a wide range of government 
operations to invasive judicial superintendence,” thereby creating a 
situation in which “[e]very government action . . . could present a potential 
federal constitutional question.”65 This, the Court cautioned, “would raise 
serious federalism and separation-of-powers concerns.”66 
In Guarnieri, a public employee argued that both his filing of a union 
grievance and his related lawsuit were protected by the First Amendment’s 
right to petition and, thus, the adverse employment consequences that 
resulted from these employment-related petitions amounted to 
unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights.67 Even 
Justice Scalia, who objected to the majority’s unwillingness to attend to the 
unique history and functions of the Petition Clause, maintained that “the 
Petition Clause protects public employees against retaliation for filing 
petitions unless those petitions are addressed to the government in its 
capacity as the petitioners’ employer, rather than its capacity as their 
sovereign.”68 He too, in other words, sought to hold the line between 
government as employer and government as sovereign for constitutional 
purposes. 
                                               
61. See Post, supra note 60, at 1723.  
62. See id. at 1740–42.  
63. Compare Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939), with Greer v. 
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).   
64. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). 
65. 564 U.S. 379, 390–91 (2011). 
66. Id. at 391. 
67. Id. at 382–84. 












At this point, some (myself included) may object that the existing 
freedom of association doctrine’s focus on expressive associations is unduly 
limited.69 Even assuming, however, that the very act of association is 
expressive—as John Inazu has persuasively argued—a plaintiff like Janus, 
in choosing to work in Illinois’s unionized Department of Healthcare and 
Family Services rather than a nonunionized alternative, has already 
affirmatively chosen to associate (expressively).70  
The bottom line is that in choosing to work for the government in a 
unionized setting, petitioners have already chosen association over non-
association, as employees. There is no forced association of any kind. 
Perhaps in recognition of these damning facts, nonunion members 
invariably recast their objection by invoking a slew of precedents from the 
Court’s compelled speech doctrine. Rebecca Friedrichs, whose case against 
the California Teacher’s Association was poised to strike down Abood until 
Scalia’s unexpected passing, argued that her challenge was to “the largest 
regime of compelled political speech in the Nation.”71 Taken in the most 
generous light, the argument appears to be: I may have freely chosen to 
work with these state employees, but I did not freely agree to these fair-
share service fees.72 Moreover, to the degree association is facilitated by 
speech, surely I, the unwilling participant, should be constitutionally 
protected from compelled subsidization of the union’s speech. 
To the degree the decision to work for a unionized state employer is a 
free one, the requirement to pay associated employment-related fees can 
only be construed as similarly voluntary. The “compelled” fair-share service 
fee is directly related to this affirmatively chosen association. Nonunion 
employees are only asked to pay this fee because they have freely chosen to 
                                               
69. See, e.g., Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations, supra note 21, at 54–68, 99–
103 & n.213 (arguing that to the degree nonexpressive associations further an array of First Amendment 
goals they ought to be protected); Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 999–1000 (arguing that the Court operates 
with too narrow a definition of “expressive associations” and that the doctrine should be expanded to 
cover a “wide range of broadly democratic associations that deserve First Amendment protection”); 
JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 1–6, 20–62, 156 (2012) 
(criticizing current doctrine for being insufficiently protective of dissenting associations and defending 
the need to provide robust protection for illiberal associations—defined as those that dissent from liberal 
values). 
70. INAZU, supra note 69, at 160 (arguing that the Court’s current doctrine is underprotective of 
dissenting associations and criticizing the distinction between “expressive and nonexpressive 
association” for “fail[ing] to recognize that . . . all associations have expressive potential” because “every 
associational act . . . has expressive potential”); John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
1093, 1094–96 (2013) (arguing that associational boundaries are formed and maintained by excluding, 
embracing, expelling, and establishing—each of which are inherently expressive acts). 
71. Brief of Petitioners Friedrichs, supra note 52, at 1. 
72. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 851 F.3d 746 (7th 
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2017) (No. 16-1466). 











associate as employees with their unionized co-workers.73 They have 
chosen to become state social workers or public school teachers—rather 
than working for private social work agencies or charter or private 
schools—in full knowledge that they have chosen a unionized work setting, 
with higher wages.  
To suggest otherwise is to fundamentally misconceive the nature of 
coercion in a liberal legal order. As Justice Cardozo aptly observed, in the 
not unrelated context of monetary incentives:  
[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to 
plunge the law in endless difficulties. . . . [It] is the acceptance of a 
philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible. Till 
now the law has been guided by a robust common sense which 
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the 
solution of its problems.74 
Some will object that this risks returning us to Justice Holmes’s view that 
an individual “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”75 It does not. Fair-share service fees 
do not impinge any employee’s “constitutional right to talk politics” by 
forcing a choice between employment and exercising rights protected by the 
freedom of speech or association.76 No one—pro- or anti-union—is asked 
to give up a constitutional right in order to remain employed.77   
Put differently, these are not unconstitutional conditions cases. To claim 
that “agency-shop arrangements in the public sector . . . force individuals to 
contribute money to unions as a condition of government employment” 
fundamentally misconstrues the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.78  The 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the government from 
conditioning access to its largesse (including benefits, licenses, tax 
exemptions, and government employment) but not to its cash (the term of 
art is “subsidies”) on the giving up of a constitutional right.79 It provides 
                                               
73. Cf. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 387 (observing that “the consensual nature of the employment 
relationship” justifies limiting First Amendment rights in certain contexts).  
74. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937). 
75. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (upholding the 
dismissal of a police officer for engaging in political activity, including joining a political committee). 
But see O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716–17 (1996) (“The Court has 
rejected for decades now the proposition that a public employee has no right to a government job and so 
cannot complain that termination violates First Amendment rights, a doctrine once captured in Justice 
Holmes’ aphorism that although a policeman ‘may have a constitutional right to talk politics . . . he has 
no constitutional right to be a policeman.’”). 
76. McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517. 
77. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
78. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 181 (2007). 
79. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (upholding federal regulations 












that “even though a person [may have] no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental 
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any 
number of reasons,” the government may not deny said benefit to penalize 
him for exercising “his constitutionally protected speech or associations.”80 
More specifically, in the context of government employment, it has entailed 
that “public employer[s may not] . . . leverage the employment relationship 
to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the [First Amendment] liberties 
employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.”81   
The paradigmatic unconstitutional conditions cases, in the context of 
government employees, involve scenarios like those invoked by Justice 
Holmes: A government employee is terminated for participating in 
disfavored expression or association.82 In Elrod v. Burns, for instance, the 
Court held that it was unconstitutional for the newly elected Democratic 
sheriff to require employees to “pledge their political allegiance to the 
Democratic Party” in order to maintain their employment.83 Similarly, in 
Branti v. Finkel, the Court found the New York public defender in violation 
of the First Amendment for implicitly conditioning continued employment 
on transferring political loyalty to the governing party.84 In other words, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is predicated on Justice Stone’s apt 
recognition that, “Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of . . . 
coercion.”85  
Agreements requiring fair-share service fees do not impose an 
unconstitutional condition on the voluntary act of employment because they 
do not require dissenting employees to relinquish any First Amendment 
rights—speech or association—as a condition of employment. They do not 
force state employees to join the union qua civic association as a condition 
of employment. Nor do they forbid nonunion employees from exercising 
                                               
360 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of congressional decision to deny food stamps to striking 
workers); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (vindicating 
First Amendment claim of a teacher who was “dismissed from his position . . . for sending a letter to a 
local newspaper in connection with a recently proposed tax increase”); see also Autor v. Pritzker, 740 
F.3d 176, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (suggesting that the doctrine only “require[s] the benefit . . . to have 
measurable economic worth” to be subject to the test).  
80. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
81. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
82. See, e.g., Perry, 408 U.S. at 594 (involving alleged dismissal of an untenured college 
professor in retaliation for his participation in an association seeking to the lobby legislature for tenure 
protections); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (challenging 
conditioning eligibility for a teaching position on nonmembership in a subversive organization). 
83. 427 U.S. 347, 351, 355 (1976) (finding the practice of discharging employees “solely because 
they did not support and were not members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the 
sponsorship of one of its leaders” to be a significant “restraint . . . on freedoms of belief and association”). 
84. 445 U.S. 507 (1980); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
85. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 81 (1936). 











their constitutional right to speak out against unionism.86 Finally, to the 
degree the fees further speech, they further only the union’s efforts to 
communicate with government officials qua employer (not qua 
sovereign).87  
As with the union’s challenge to Wisconsin’s restrictive labor law, here 
too, the government has “not bar[red] [its employees] from joining any 
advocacy groups, limit[ed] their ability to do so, or otherwise curtail[ed] 
their ability to join other ‘like-minded individuals to associate for the 
purpose of expressing commonly held views.’”88 Nonunion employees are 
free to refuse to join the union, free to associate with right-to-work groups, 
and free to speak to advance their views (including engaging in litigation 
and lobbying). In sum, mandatory fair-share service fees are nothing like 
the provision of Philadelphia’s Charter, which the Third Circuit recently 
struck down, that prevented police officers from making voluntary 
contributions to the union’s political action committee.89 
This is not to deny that many employees who accept unionized public-
sector jobs are likely to object to any number of the bargaining units’ 
policies. Young, talented teachers may object to a system in which 
promotions and pay are related to seniority rather than merit. Math and 
science teachers might prefer pay scales tied to education.  
These employees are, however, in no worse situation than dissenting 
members of any civic association. When the Boy Scouts of America adhered 
to a policy of excluding openly gay members from positions of leadership, 
no doubt there were many families who did not approve. Like those 
dissenting members, these dissenting public-sector employees have many 
opportunities to express their reservations. They can remain on the 
                                               
86. In fact, they do not even place an indirect burden on such speech as the federal law which 
“broadly prohibit[ed] federal employees from accepting any compensation for making speeches or 
writing articles” arguably did. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995). 
87. The above is a defense of Abood as a matter of First Amendment doctrine and principle. It 
is, of course, possible—indeed likely—that operationalizing the line between employment-related 
advocacy and political advocacy requires refining. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 
550 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “[a] union may 
constitutionally compel contributions from dissenting nonmembers in any agency shop . . . only for the 
costs of performing the union’s statutory duties as exclusive bargaining agent”); see also Brief for Amici 
Curiae Charles Fried & Robert C. Post in Support of Neither Party at 3–4, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, 
Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, No. 16-1466 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2017) (arguing for replacing the current 
germaneness test with one that permits the collection of fees related to statutory duties alone in the 
interest of preserving the appropriate balance between competing speech rights). 
88. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337, 356 (Wis. 2014) (quoting Knox v. Serv. 
Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012)). 
89. Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 763 F.3d 358, 360, 384 
(3d Cir. 2014) (striking down charter provision that barred “police officers from making donations 
‘received by a candidate . . . for use in advocating or influencing the election of the candidate,’ or . . . 
‘received by a political committee, political party, or partisan political group’” on the ground that it was 












workforce and lobby their employer in its sovereign capacity to restrict the 
parameters of collective bargaining, testifying in favor of merit- and market-
based pay scales and against fair-share service fees. They could choose to 
join the union and seek to change its rules internally, or they could exit, in 
frustration, by moving to a nonunionized work setting or a right-to-work 
state. To suggest that these choices are not free is, as Justice Cardozo 
recognized, to “accept[] . . . a philosophical determinism by which choice 
becomes impossible.”90 
C. Beyond Doctrine: Reaffirming Abood as a Matter of First Amendment 
Principles 
Abood’s central holding is also sound as a matter of First Amendment 
principle. It creates a constitutional order which preserves the full range of 
First Amendment rights without intruding on a core legislative domain—
labor regulation. In doing so, it strikes exactly the sort of balance between 
the freedom of speech and the freedom of association that a jurisprudence 
attentive to the First Amendment as a whole, rather than the free speech 
clause in isolation, demands. 
First, Abood underwrites a legislative prerogative to determine economic 
policy.91 It preserves legislative decisions to regulate—and, in the spirit of 
federalism, a range of legislative decisions—in order to offset the collective 
action problems likely to result were unions required to provide 
representation for nonmember employees without being able to collect fees 
from them. 
Second, the First Amendment establishes not only an open marketplace 
of ideas, but also an open marketplace of civic associations. Abood allows 
both postulates to be respected. First, it frees nonunion members from 
compelled association with the union qua civic association and from 
compelled political contributions. It, thereby, vindicates the individual’s 
First Amendment right to choose to dissent from the project of unionism 
and to join opposing political associations. Second, it refuses to extend to 
that same individual a First Amendment right to refuse to pay fees to cover 
employment-related representation. It, thereby, underwrites the First 
Amendment’s structural interest in providing protection to the sorts of civic 
organizations that foster informed political participation.  
The claim here is not that Abood is normatively sound because it props 
up unions. Rather, the claims is that Abood is sound because it leaves in 
place the status quo—a highly imperfect pluralist chorus through which the 
                                               
90. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
91. See Madison Teachers, Inc., 851 N.W.2d at 355 (noting “[i]t is a prerogative of a state to 
establish workplace policy”). 











public collectively seeks to produce democratic accountability, a chorus in 
which unions play an important, if shrinking, part. 
By contrast, any decision expanding the compelled speech doctrine to 
protect nonunion members from being required to pay a fair-share service 
fee risks constitutionalizing a labor regime that could quickly lead to the 
tragedy of the commons. Even pro-union workers might make the 
economically rational decision to withhold their fees, hoping that others will 
fund the union. The relevant free-rider problem, from the perspective of the 
freedom of association, in other words, is not that nonmembers—those who 
oppose unionism, like Janus—will free ride on the union’s effort, as Justice 
Alito claims.92  It is, rather, the incentives such a labor regime would create 
for individuals who genuinely support the union.93 
Under the labor law regimes adopted by states like Illinois and 
California, there is no similar opportunity to free ride. Both union and 
nonunion employees are required to pay their fair share of the employment-
related representation that the union has a duty to provide on an equal basis. 
As Justice Scalia explained— 
Where the state imposes upon the union a duty to deliver services, it 
may permit the union to demand reimbursement for them . . . . 
[P]rivate speech often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and that 
does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for. 
What is distinctive, however, about the “free riders” [in unions] . . . 
is that . . . the law requires the union to carry [them]—indeed, 
requires the union to go out of its way to benefit [them], even at the 
expense of its other interests . . . . [T]he free ridership (if it were left 
to be that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed by 
circumstances but mandated by government decree.94 
What Justice Scalia failed to play out is that this also means that compelled 
fair-share service fees are necessary to counteract the very real, free-rider 
problem that would arise among members if such fees were optional. 
                                               
92. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (explaining that 
“‘[t]he primary purpose’ of permitting unions to collect fees from nonmembers . . . is ‘to prevent 
nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts, sharing the employment benefits obtained by the 
union’s collective bargaining without sharing the costs incurred’” while emphasizing that “[s]uch free-
rider arguments . . . are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections”) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ., Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 181 (2007)). To be clear, my claim is 
not that the nonunion member free-rider problem is unimportant; it is, instead, that this second free-rider 
problems is particularly important given the broader structural interests of the First Amendment. 
93. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2656 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In such a 
circumstance, not just those who oppose but those who favor a union have an economic incentive to 
withhold dues; only altruism or loyalty—as against financial self-interest—can explain their support.”). 
94. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 












To be sure, the actual risks that pro-union members will withhold fees 
are highly contentious, and right-to-work advocates are quick to cite 
evidence that unionism will survive the abolition of fair-share service fees. 
Beyond the fact that the federal work force is unionized in the absence of 
such fees,95 some are quick to point out that states like Nevada, Iowa, 
Florida and Nebraska, which permit unions to become the exclusive 
representatives of workers, but forbid the collection of mandatory fair-share 
service fees, have relatively high rates of public-sector union membership—
37.9 percent in Nevada, 27.9 percent in Iowa, 27.2 percent in Nebraska.96 
The empirical uncertainty regarding the effect abolishing fair-share 
service fees will have on union membership levels is a product of a variety 
of factors. First, it is often difficult to draw conclusions from studies 
comparing right-to-work and pro-union states because the two types of 
states tend to vary along a range of relevant characteristics.97 Second, right-
to-work laws, historically at least, have been enacted in states whose unions 
are weak; thus, little of interest is to be gleaned from the fact that there is 
not a drop in unionism.98 Finally, right-to-work laws themselves vary 
significantly.99   
But the very fact that the risks are uncertain points to the legislature as 
the proper forum for resolving the debate. As we have seen, Abood does not 
permit states to force the subsidization of the union’s political speech. It 
prevents constitutionalizing a policy choice that risks creating significant 
                                               
95. Compare Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640 with id. at 2657 n.7 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing 
RICHARD C. KEARNEY & PATRICE M. MARESCHAL, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 26 (5th 
ed. 2014) which notes that “[T]he largest federal union, the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE), represented approximately 650,000 bargaining unit members in 2012, but less than 
half of them were dues-paying members” and further that “out of the approximately 1.9 million full-
time federal wage system (blue-collar) and General Schedule (white-collar) employees who are 
represented by a collective bargaining contract, only one-third actually belong to the union and pay 
dues”); see also Brief of Amici Social Scientists in Support of Respondents, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers 
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915) (mem.), aff’g per curiam No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 
(9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Social Scientists]. 
96. Amicus Curiae Brief of National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., in Support 
of Petitioners at 18 n.12, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915) (mem.), 
aff’g per curiam No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) (citing Chris 
Edwards, Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of Employee Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87, 106 
(2010)) [hereinafter Brief of NRTWLD Foundation]. Other right-to-work states preclude exclusive 
representation. In these states, public-sector union membership is very low: 4.2 percent in Georgia, 5.2 
percent in Virginia, 6 percent in Mississippi, and 8.2 percent in South and North Carolina. Id. 
97. See James Feigenbaum et al., From the Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box: Political Effects 
of Right to Work Laws 5 (Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that “[o]ne 
major obstacle to identifying the effects of [Right-to-Work] laws comes from the fact that states that 
pass such measures are often very different from non-[Right-to-Work] state across a number of 
important economic, social, and political dimensions that could themselves account for the differences 
in future outcomes”). 
98. I want to extend a particular thanks to Professor Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, an expert in 
the area, for explaining the axes of this debate to me. 
99. See Brief of Amici Social Scientists, supra note 95, at 16–19. 











collective action dilemmas—leaving it, instead, to state legislatures to 
decide how to assess such risk.  
The unrecognized virtue of Abood, in other words, is that it permits some 
states, like Illinois and California, to create a labor regime in which there is 
no opportunity to free ride, and other states, such as Nevada and West 
Virginia, to do otherwise. It recognizes that the First Amendment not only 
establishes an open marketplace of ideas, but also an open marketplace of 
civic associations. Most importantly, in doing so, it vindicates an 
appropriate balance between freedom of speech and association: It does not 
jeopardize eroding the kinds of civic associations that make responsive and 
responsible governance more possible on the basis of questionable 
individual free speech claims. 
In sum, although it is doubtful that it will, the Supreme Court ought to 
reaffirm the constitutionality of fair-share service fees.100 A decision in 
favor of the Janus plaintiffs permits the First Amendment to be used to 
undermine the very sorts of civic organizations that the First Amendment is 
meant to protect. In this regard, it is not only misguided as a matter of 
existing doctrine, but also undesirable as a matter of First Amendment 
principle. The Court should leave the ideological fights over unionism to 
the political process where they belong and refrain from constitutionalizing 
a labor regime that may well erode one of the essential prerequisites of 
representative government that the First Amendment was designed to 
protect: a pluralist civil society comprised of membership-based 
organizations that foster informed political participation. 
II. BEYOND JANUS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-SANCTIONED 
EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING 
Given that a divided Supreme Court is likely to reverse Abood, it is 
incumbent to explain how the arguments made above resonate beyond the 
specific issue under consideration in Janus. The simple answer is that Janus 
is only the beginning.101 The freedom of association analysis laid out above 
provides an antidote to the superficial appeal of the First Amendment 
claims, percolating in the lower courts, by public-sector employees who 
oppose statutory entitlements to create exclusive bargaining units. There can 
be no return from the Lochnerian precipice until lawyers muster a 
compelling First Amendment argument for the status quo—one which 
                                               
100. The petitioner in Janus have invoked the freedom of association. See generally Brief for 
Petitioner Janus, supra note 52. However, neither party has devoted significant attention to the nuances 
of freedom of association doctrine. 
101. See generally Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. 













explains why the doctrinal status quo vindicates core First Amendment 
principles. The rote invocation of the importance of fealty to precedent will 
not be enough.102   
A second thread of litigation percolating in the lower courts challenges 
the very constitutionality of state-sanctioned exclusive bargaining units—
so-called “compelled” unionism.103 Plaintiffs argue that the very 
establishment of a statutory right to organize an exclusive bargaining unit 
infringes upon the First Amendment rights of dissenting members.  In Hill 
v. Service Employees International Union, for example, plaintiffs 
challenged Illinois’s Public Labor Relations Act, which permits over 60,000 
in-home, healthcare and childcare providers, whose private employment is 
reimbursed by the State, to unionize.104 Plaintiffs argued that the creation of 
a statutory right to establish an exclusive bargaining unit, pursuant to an 
election, infringed upon the constitutional rights of dissenting members.105 
The scheme, they argued, was unconstitutional notwithstanding the fact that 
personal and childcare providers are not required to join the union or pay 
fair-share services fees.106 
Lower courts, to date, have dismissed these claims107 on the ground that 
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight forecloses 
them.108 In Knight, a group of community college professors challenged the 
constitutionality of the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act, 
which permitted state workers (as well as those working for localities and 
administrative agencies) to designate, by majority vote, an exclusive 
bargaining agent to negotiate on their behalf with respect to conditions of 
                                               
102. See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2644–45 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (opening 
her dissent with “Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. answers the question presented in this case” and her 
analysis with “I begin where this case should also end—with this Court’s decision in Abood”) (citation 
omitted). The unions’ primary argument each time the issue has been before the Supreme Court has 
emphasized the need for fealty to precedent. See Brief for Respondent American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 at 1–2, 16, 18–20, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & 
Mun. Emps., Council 31, No. 16-1466 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018); Brief of Respondents California Teachers 
Association, et al. in Opposition at 10–13, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) 
(No. 14-915) (mem.), aff’g per curiam No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014).  
103. See, e.g., Hill v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017); D’Agostino v. Baker, 
812 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 2016) (Souter, J.). 
104. Hill, 850 F.3d at 862. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 864 (holding further that the fact that Harris v. Quinn held states could not mandate 
fair-share services fees for such quasi-workers does not imply that the state may not provide such 
workers an opportunity to unionize and to establish an exclusive bargaining unit). 
107. See, e.g., D’Agostino, 812 F.3d at 240; Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 Fed. App’x 72 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(unpublished opinion); Bierman v. Dayton,  227 F. Supp. 3d 1022 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal docketed, 
No. 17-1244 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017); Mentele v. Inslee, No. C15-5134-RBL, 2016 WL 3017713 (W.D. 
Wash. 2016). The challenged statutes do not require employees to join the union, and most of them also 
do not require fair-share service fees. 
108. 465 U.S. 271, 273–74 (1984). 











employment.109 The Act obliged government employers to “meet and 
negotiate” in good faith on the “terms and conditions of employment” with 
any exclusive bargaining unit established pursuant to the Act; at the same 
time, it prohibited employers from meeting or conferring with any 
employee, other than the designated agent, once an exclusive bargaining 
unit had been established.110 The statute provided a narrow carve out for 
professional employees, including college faculty; under this carve out, 
certain professionals were granted a right to “meet and confer” with their 
employers on policy matters “outside the scope of mandatory 
bargaining.”111  
The Knight plaintiffs challenged the limitations placed on their ability to 
“meet and confer” with government employers—but, interestingly, not the 
exclusive authority of the bargaining unit to negotiate on their behalf with 
respect to conditions of employment.112 The Supreme Court, however, was 
not persuaded that the contract presented a significant constitutional burden, 
essentially accusing the plaintiffs of conflating their First Amendment right 
to speak and associate—which had not been burdened—with a nonexistent 
“right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy.”113 On this 
point, the Court was unequivocal: “Nothing in the First Amendment or in 
this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, 
associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond 
to individuals’ communications on public issues.”114 In explicating why no 
First Amendment rights had been burdened, the Court emphasized that the 
statute did not prevent faculty members, in their individual capacities, to 
speak on matters related to public policy or to submit advice or 
recommendations through work channels, and it did not restrict their 
individual freedom to associate (or refuse to associate) with others 
(including the union).115 
                                               
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 274–76 (noting further that the State Board for Community Colleges viewed the union 
representatives as providing “the faculty’s official collective position”). 
111. Id. at 273–74 (emphasis added) (explaining that scope of mandatory bargaining was defined 
to include “the hours of employment, the compensation, . . . and the employer’s personnel policies 
affecting the working conditions of the employees”). 
112. Id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]n this appeal, there is no dispute that 
Minnesota may limit the process of negotiation on the terms and conditions of public employment to the 
union that represents the employees in a given collective bargaining unit”). 
113. Id. at 283 (noting further that there is “no constitutional right to force the government to listen 
to [one’s] views” even in higher education and that the long tradition of faculty participation in 
governance at universities is a matter of good policy only). 
114. Id. at 285 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 
U.S. 463 (1979)). 
115. Knight, 465 U.S. at 288 (“The state has in no way restrained appellees’ freedom to speak on 
any education-related issue or their freedom to associate or not to associate with whom they please, 












Knight notwithstanding, it is clear that libertarian, right-to-work 
advocates seek to persuade the Supreme Court to unsettle the 
constitutionality of exclusive bargaining units in the public sector and 
beyond. Their determination will be further fortified if the Court overrules 
Abood this term.  
Unlike the challenges to fair-share service fees, a decision to overrule 
Knight would call into question the heart of the New Deal Court’s 
compromise, which left to legislative prerogative basic economic and labor 
policy in rejection of Lochnerism. In particular, it would raise significant 
questions about the constitutionality of private-sector unions, which are also 
statutorily authorized.116  
First Amendment challenges to the very existence of state-sanctioned 
exclusive bargaining in the public sector fare no better under existing 
freedom of association doctrine than challenges to fair-share service fees. 
First, as with fair-share service fees, there is no forced association of any 
kind. Fair-share service fees, as we saw, are specifically charged to cover 
employment-related advocacy directly resulting from the voluntary choice 
to join a unionized employment setting. They cannot, therefore, be 
reasonably construed as compelled. The same analysis applies in challenges 
to state-sanctioned exclusive bargaining units. Dissenting employees have 
affirmatively chosen to join an employment situation governed by a 
bargaining unit. The nonunion employees only find themselves in their 
predicament because of that voluntary choice. 
Second, even if one were to question the voluntariness of this 
association, there is no constitutionally recognizable compelled association 
because the state has only mandated that its employees associate for 
economic purposes with the union in its non-expressive activity.117 As with 
fair-share service fees, the exclusive bargaining unit is not the kind of 
association to which the freedom of association attaches. The union, as 
economic association, does not qualify as an expressive association under 
existing First Amendment doctrine. Accordingly, there can be no First 
Amendment bar to forced association with them.  
                                               
116. See White v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 13000, 370 F.3d 346, 349 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that the union was a state actor while “not[ing] . . . that the courts of 
appeals are divided on the question whether actions taken by a union pursuant to an agency-shop 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement constitute state action” and “[t]he Supreme Court has 
explicitly left this issue open”); cf. Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908, at 
*3 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (noting that the plaintiiffs’ First Amendment challenge to a Seattle Ordinance 
that provided opportunity for for-hire drivers, who operated as independent contractors, to unionize 
failed, in part, because they “ma[de] no attempt to show that the legislative authorization for exclusive 
collective negotiations, standing alone, constitutes impermissible government interference in the 
marketplace of ideas”). 
117. See supra notes 24–33 (explaining why employment-related association cannot be construed 
as expressive under existing freedom of association doctrine). 











The charge that granting exclusive bargaining authority “is 
extraordinary” insofar as “[f]ew, if any, other advocacy organizations are 
vested with the power to force government policymakers to meet and 
negotiate with them over public policies, much less bind government to 
follow certain policies”—despite its rhetorical flare—is meritless.118 The 
reason “vaunted political powerhouses like the AARP and National Rifle 
Association lack authority to force government to negotiate with them over 
retirement or firearm policies that affect their members” is because such 
associations interact with the state qua sovereign, whereas the union, in its 
collective bargaining capacity, interacts with the state only qua employer.119 
When a union seeks to engage with state qua sovereign, as civic 
association—that is when it seeks to privately or publicly lobby the 
legislature or individual representatives as the AARP or NRA does—it too 
has no guaranteed seat at the table. 
Third, and critically, dissenting employees’ freedom of expressive 
association, like their freedom of speech, is fully preserved: They remain 
free to express their opposition to unionism as individuals and by joining 
advocacy groups (including the National Right to Work Committee and its 
local affiliates) and free to lobby the state to repeal laws that facilitate a 
robust form of unionism.120 They are similarly free to refuse to join the 
union (qua civic association) and free to refuse to subsidize its political 
speech. 
These freedoms, moreover, explain why the existence of exclusive 
bargaining units in the public sector does not constitute an unconstitutional 
condition. State-sanctioned exclusive bargaining units do not create 
situations where the state has dictated what its employees can say or with 
whom they must associate. 
This point bears some emphasis because the D.C. Circuit recently held 
that while Knight vindicates the government’s freedom to choose its 
advisors, it does not preclude the application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.121 The case, Autor v. Pritzker, involved a challenge to 
an executive order issued by President Obama that “bar[red] federally 
                                               
118. Brief of NRTWLD Foundation, supra note 96, at 9–10.  
119. Id. 
120. About The National Right to Work Committee, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMM. 
https://nrtwc.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/P8CG-DQ5E] (describing itself as a “national grass-roots 
organization in America dedicated exclusively to combatting the evils of compulsory unionism”). 
121. Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Like the state in Knight, the 
government insists that it has ‘simply restricted the class of persons to whom it will listen in its making 
of policy.’”). The government also argued for sweeping presidential power to choose its advisors, which 
the D.C. Circuit rejects as both overbroad and inopposite insofar as ITAC is a congressionally created 












registered lobbyists from serving on advisory committees.”122 Plaintiffs, a 
group of registered lobbyists, argued that the order amounted to an 
unconstitutional condition because the only way to remain eligible to serve 
on an advisory committee (such as the Industry Trade Advisory Committee) 
is to forgo one’s “First Amendment right to petition government.”123 The 
district court had rejected these claims on the ground that Knight’s 
recognition of the government’s freedom to choose its advisors precluded 
the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.124 The D.C. 
Circuit was not persuaded: The government’s right to choose with whom it 
will confer does not permit it to make the giving up of a constitutional right  
a prerequisite for eligibility to be a chosen advisor.125 Unlike President 
Obama’s executive order, however, state-sanctioned exclusive bargaining 
units do not require government employees to give up any First Amendment 
rights as a prerequisite for eligibility for state employment. 
Finally, Knight leaves labor policy to legislatures and the political 
process per the New Deal compromise. It preserves the opportunity for 
unions to succeed in the political process—for example, to secure the 
privilege to negotiate for an exclusive bargaining unit—just as it preserves 
a similar opportunity for right-to-work advocates to succeed in the rough-
and-tumble of politics. In fact, as it happens, it leaves these matters to the 
states: The political safeguards of federalism have worked, and Congress 
has been persuaded to leave the most controversial form of unionism—
public-sector unionism and agency and closed shops—to the states 
themselves.126 
Somewhat encouragingly, when plaintiffs squarely asserted their 
opposition to state-mandated exclusive bargaining as a challenge to 
compelled association, the first of these points was not lost on the district 
court. Bierman v. Dayton involved a challenge to a Minnesota statute that 
authorized in-home care providers, paid through the state’s Medicaid 
                                               
122. Id. at 177 (noting, further, that the order applied only to a narrow group of lobbyists—those 
required to register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act—and was justified as an effort “to reduce the 
‘culture of special interest access’”). 
123. Id. at 183. 
124. Id. at 180. 
125. Id. at 181 (concluding “Knight does not control this case” because while Knight “recognized 
that the government may choose to hear from some groups at the expense of others, it never addressed 
the question . . . whether, in so doing, the government may also limit the constitutional rights of those to 
whom it chooses to listen”). 
126. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009) (noting that the First Amendment 
neither requires the government to aid speech or association nor prohibits it from doing so—that choice 
is fundamentally a choice for state legislatures and, in our federalist union, as we would anticipate, 
different states make different choices). As previously mentioned, the National Labor Relations Act does 
not cover state and local employees,. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (expressly excluding state and political 
subdivisions from its definition of “employer”). 











program, to unionize upon a thirty percent ballot.127 It was brought by a 
group of parents who received compensation through Medicaid for the 
provision of in-home care to their disabled children. The plaintiffs argued 
that the arrangement violated their First Amendment right not to associate 
with the certified exclusive bargaining unit.128 In rejecting their claims, the 
district court found the forced association claim untenable: Not only had the 
child care providers not been forced to join the union, or prevented from 
joining groups that opposed collective bargaining, but they had willingly 
created the alleged constitutional violation.129 The district court went so far 
as to observe that the plaintiffs were perfectly free to choose to provide in-
home care to their disabled children without compensation from the state.130 
The court concluded that to the degree state compensation drove the 
“employment” relationship, it was an association the plaintiffs affirmatively 
chose.  
Although the arguments against overturning Knight are similar in many 
respects to those that caution against overturning Abood, there is one respect 
in which they are even stronger: A decision to overrule Knight implicates 
far more than just unions, having wide ramifications for federal 
administrative agencies.  
A driving concern throughout Knight was that a decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs would effectively create a constitutional entitlement to be heard 
by public policymakers.131 The First Amendment rights to speak and 
petition, it warned, do not entail a “constitutional right to force the 
government to listen to [one’s] views.”132  Even in higher education, the 
long tradition of faculty participation in governance is merely a matter of 
good policy.133 On this point, the Court was unequivocal: “Nothing in the 
First Amendment or in this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the 
rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to 
listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public issues.”134  
Knight, in other words, is of a piece with Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. 
State Board of Equalization, which held that there is no individualized 
                                               
127. 227 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1024 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1244 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 
2017). 
128. See id. at 1028–29. 
129. Id. at 1029. 
130. Id. 
131. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984) (chastising petitioners 
for conflating their First Amendment right to speak and associate—which had not been burdened—with 
a nonexistent “right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy”). 
132. Id. at 283. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 285 (emphasis added) (relying on Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 
U.S. 463 (1979),  a case which had rejected a First Amendment challenge brought by a public union that 













constitutional right to a hearing before a rulemaking body, when it adopts a 
“rule of conduct appl[ying] to more than a few people.”135 Nor was the 
Knight Court’s position driven exclusively by practical concerns. As in Bi-
Metallic itself, the Knight Court argued that the republican form of 
government precludes such an entitlement, observing that “[i]t is inherent 
in a republican form of government that direct public participation in 
government policymaking is limited.”136 It, further, emphasized: 
“Policymaking organs in our system of government have never operated 
under a constitutional constraint requiring them to afford every interested 
member of the public an opportunity to present testimony before any policy 
is adopted.”137 
In the end, both the sweeping practical implications and entrenched 
understanding of republicanism offer reasons to believe the Roberts Court 
will hesitate when the invitation to overturn Knight arises. That said, a 
compelling account, grounded in existing freedom of association doctrine, 
as well as basic First Amendment principle, could go a long way toward 
reinforcing that instinct. 
On the other hand, if the Court does overrule Knight, there will be 
significant ramifications for unions—even beyond the public sector. Unlike 
the challenges to fair-share service fees, a decision to overrule Knight would 
not be self-limiting to the public sector. The challenge in Janus turns on the 
(mistaken) position that the terms and condition of state employment are 
necessarily political insofar as they implicate not only educational or law 
enforcement policy, but also state budgets.138 The silver lining is that there 
is no way to transport that argument to the context of negotiations with 
private-sector employers.  
There would be no similar silver lining for private-sector unions were 
the Court to overrule Knight. The primary objection to exclusive bargaining 
units is that, at the behest of the state action, they prevent individuals from 
negotiating with their employers on an individual basis.139 If the First 
Amendment bars a state from enabling the creation of an exclusive 
bargaining unit in the public sector because it infringes on an individual 
employee’s right to advocate for himself with respect to employment, the 
bar applies equally where the employer is private and the governmental 
actor is Congress. Labor relations in the private sector—with only minor 
exceptions—are governed by federal law. Federal statutes—primarily the 
                                               
135. 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
136. Knight, 465 U.S. at 285. 
137. Id. at 284. 
138. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing why the distinction is misguided). 
139. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908 at *3–4 (W.D. 
Wash. 2017). 











National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act—impose on 
private employers the duty to bargain with an exclusive representative 
chosen by a majority of the bargaining unit.140 Statutory law, in other words, 
establishes the opportunity in the private sector to create a bargaining unit 
and mandates that employers treat it as the exclusive representative of their 
employees in negotiations over the terms and conditions of employment.  
While the details of public and private sector labor statutes vary, the 
overarching structure is the same: Statutory law permits and enforces the 
establishment of unions capable of preempting individuals from negotiating 
on their own behalf with respect to conditions of employment. The 
justification for such regulation is, of course, that in the absence of state-
sanction, the collective action problems associated with organizing a union 
are immense despite its aggregate benefits for all involved.  
Moreover, challenges to compelled unionism in the private sector cannot 
take advantage of the line of First Amendment cases that acknowledge the 
distinct roles government plays as sovereign and proprietor.141 The 
government, in requiring employers to respect exclusive bargaining units 
that meet statutory requirements, is acting as a sovereign regulator, rather 
than as employer. Freedom of association doctrine, with its analogous 
distinction between expressive and nonexpresssive (including economic) 
associations, thus, provides the only First Amendment safe harbor. 
Finally, it is worth recognizing that a reversal of Knight would also 
amount to a formal return to Lochnerism, and a rejection of the long 
recognized prerogative of legislatures to regulate the economy. Since the 
New Deal, that prerogative has included the right to predicate eligibility to 
participate in the market on any number of conditions—from the agreement 
to pay a fair wage or hire union members to an openness to contract with 
individuals regardless of race, sex, political affiliation, pregnancy status, or 
sexual orientation.142 
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CONCLUSION: DYNAMIC DIVERSITY AND BEYOND 
In concluding, I would like to take a moment to reflect on how the 
contested constitutional status of central pillars of unionism today might 
inform our discussion of Professor Magarian’s first book, Managed Speech: 
The Roberts Court’s First Amendment. 
Managed Speech is a welcome addition to the corpus of legal scholarship 
on the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. It provides a much-
needed antidote to the tendency of observers (myself included) to 
overemphasize the libertarian flavor of the Roberts Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Once one broadens the scope beyond the 
Court’s commercial and compelled speech cases, as Professor Magarian 
has, and reviews the entire corpus of the cases it has decided involving the 
First Amendment, over its first decade, the picture looks more complicated.  
Professor Magarian persuasively argues that Burkean conservativism, 
not libertarianism, is the only way to “reconcile [the Roberts Court’s] 
substantial First Amendment protection for expressive freedom with [its] 
aggressive preservation of social and political stability.”143 The Roberts 
Court’s First Amendment doctrine, he argues, vindicates an idea of 
“managed speech.”144 It routinely “grant[s] wealthy and powerful actors, 
whether governmental or private, managerial control over public 
discussion; . . . disregard[s] the expressive interests of politically, socially, 
and economically marginal speakers; and . . . advance[es] the ultimate goal 
of social and political stability.”145 Professor Magarian proceeds to offer his 
own normative conception of the First Amendment, one in which the 
doctrine would be driven by a commitment to “dynamic diversity.”146 
The recent First Amendment challenges to various aspects of unionism 
suggest, at least, two friendly amendments to the liberal vision of the First 
Amendment Professor Magarian offers with his concept of dynamic 
diversity. The first is a call for more explicit acknowledgment that a 
functioning democracy requires more than boisterous discourse; it demand 
a plurality of organizations capable of shaping the policymaking process 
through protests, lobbying, getting out the vote, and appearances before 
administrative agencies and courts. The second, not unrelated, addendum is 
a caution: The First Amendment is not an end in itself, and any theory of 
the First Amendment must both grant and limit constitutional rights if it is 
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to preserve the core commitment of all democratic systems—namely, that 
the vast bulk of policymaking is reserved for the political branches. 
In this regard, the most underappreciated aspect of the entire recent 
conversation about the constitutionality of fair-share service fees is Abood’s 
virtues. Abood is rarely applauded for the ways in which it both preserves 
the balance between the various conditions for self-governance that the First 
Amendment protects and respects the core legislative perogative to make 
decisions about the nature of our economic order. 
The text of the First Amendment, as we all know, is not limited to the 
freedom of speech. It protects a range of prerequisites for responsive and 
accountable governance—including the freedom of association. In doing so, 
it indicates that the First Amendment is best understood as an effort to 
preserve a set of conditions deemed necessary for achieving a republican 
form of government.  
Those conditions certainly include an interest in promoting a diverse 
marketplace of ideas—consistent with Professor Magarian’s concept of 
dynamic diversity. But the Amendment seeks further to preserve conditions 
necessary for effective political organization and participation—an interest 
that cannot be reduced to the interest in promoting a marketplace of ideas. 
This second interest goes beyond a preference for encouraging a diversity 
of participants in public discourse. Effective political participation requires 
the capacity to act collectively—hence the Amendment’s explicit protection 
for freedom of peaceable assembly and the associated freedom of 
association.  
In this regard, it is extremely unfortunate that the Supreme Court 
routinely elides the distinct strands of the First Amendment. Too often, First 
Amendment precedent fails to articulate, let alone vindicate, the distinct 
conditions of self-governance that the freedom of speech and freedom of 
association protect.147  
But that is not true of Abood—or Knight. Abood and Knight illustrate 
how a properly calibrated First Amendment doctrine would attend to 
preserving the balance between these various conditions: Individuals’ free 
speech rights would not be so great as to undermine the co-equal rights 
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secured by the text of the First Amendment, either directly or indirectly.148 
Moreover, Abood does so while refraining from unnecessarily 
constitutionalizing a labor regime that may well erode one of the essential 
prerequisites of representative government protected by the First 
Amendment: a pluralist civil society comprised of organizations capable of 
fostering informed political participation. 
This, then, points to my first friendly amendment to Professor 
Magarian’s call for dynamic diversity: The pluralist chorus that is critically 
necessary to a functioning democracy is not merely a medley of voices; it is 
a chorus of organizations capable of flexing political muscle in the 
policymaking process. My key point is that the First Amendment protects 
more than the marketplace of ideas. It protects a marketplace of civic 
associations. Achieving representative government, especially with respect 
to policy outputs, depends on citizens being informed, organized, and 
politically active, and civic associations play a critical role on all three 
fronts.  
The centrality of a pluralist civil society, comprised of associations 
capable of fostering informed participation, to achieving democratic 
accountability cannot be overstated, especially in this time of our 
democratic dystopia. While the public is preoccupied with Citizens United 
and the flood of money they believe it has unleashed into electoral politics, 
many political scientists argue, quite persuasively, that the solicitude of 
government officials to the preferences of wealthy citizens and donors 
results from deeper and longer standing trends, including the increasing 
organizational advantage of socioeconomic elites compared to the middle 
class. Affluent Americans today are estimated to be three times more likely 
to belong to civic organizations than middle-class Americans. Three times 
more likely, that is, to belong to organizations like the Chamber of 
Commerce or the National Right to Work Foundation, both of which have 
been a key sponsors of right-to-work legislation.  
Lost in the acrimonious debate about the merits of public-sector 
unionism, in other words, is an appreciation of the fact that unions remain 
the secular backbone of the civic and political life of many ordinary 
Americans. By promoting political participation among ordinary 
Americans, unions, like churches, the PTA, and the Rotary Club, are part of 
a virtuous circle of civic mindedness, political engagement, and democratic 
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responsiveness—one that the First Amendment was established to protect 
not undermine.  
The history of American unionism illustrates this point well.  The unions 
that dominated civil society in the middle of the twentieth century, provided 
members with skills and useful political knowledge. They also canvased 
households, launched voter registration drives, and mobilized communities, 
thereby successfully drawing ordinary Americans further into political life, 
including on Election Day.  Even today, union households turn out on 
election days at much higher rates than nonunion households.  
This leads me to my second amendment to Professor Magarian’s 
conception of dynamic diversity—one which again, I view, as friendly. The 
union cases provide a much needed reminder that the First Amendment is 
not an end in itself.  Rather, it secures the particular rights identified in order 
to vindicate a central premise of all liberal democracies: Where the measure 
of the good is uncertain and contested, policy debates can only be 
legitimately resolved on a provisional basis by the legislature. 
First Amendment rights—unlike many others in our Constitution—do 
not function to preclude certain subjects from democratic deliberation. 
Instead, they serve to facilitate “the capacity of legislatures to serve their 
most basic function—reaching provisional decisions, after deliberation, on 
contested values.”149 Both the freedom of speech and the freedom of 
association, that is, serve to “ensur[e] that the political process by which 
those legislative judgments are made is an open one.”150 
To conclude, for me (but possibly not for Professor Magarian), Abood 
and Knight are unsung First Amendment heroes because they leave the 
ideological fights over unionism to the political process—where they 
belong. Each, thereby, vindicates the final end of the Amendment: 
preserving the capacity of legislatures to serve their primary function. 
Together, they illustrate how an approach to the First Amendment in which 
the freedom of association is not subsumed by the freedom of speech is an 
important antidote to both the Roberts Court’s libertarian and managerial 
tendencies—an antidote which can restore a muscular vision of democracy 
at the center of the First Amendment. 
Unionism may or may not be a good idea. Unions as civic associations 
may or may not be able to sustain their memberships. It is one thing, 
however, for market forces to undermine the associational life of ordinary 
Americans. But if unions fail to sustain themselves in the marketplace of 
civic associations, it should not be the product of the Court’s sloppy 
application of freedom of association doctrine or a misguided compelled 
                                               













speech doctrine. The First Amendment certainly shields individuals from 
compelled speech and association, but it, equally certainly, precludes the 
Court from affirmatively undermining existing civic associations and 
foreclosing democratic contestation. 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
